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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab

DALE BERKELEY WLISON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
\

vs.

\

No. 7969

DR. MERRILL L. OLDROYD,
Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
THEREOF

COMES NOW the defendant and appellant in the above
entitled case and petitions the Court for a rehearing upon
the following grounds:
1. This Court and the jury

hich tried the case in the
court belo\v \vere under a misapprehension as to the financial
\vealth of the defendant.
\V

2. The Court and the jury have ignored certain evidence
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of the plaintiff himself going to the nature of the marriage
relationship of himself and his wife.
3. The opinion of the court errs in holding that there is
nothing from which it can be determined that the verdict was
reached as a result of passion and prejudice.
4. In holding that the instructions of the Trial Court to
the jury did not constitute prejudicial error, this Court ignores
without overruling established cases in this jurisdiction.
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.
GEORGE W. WORTHEN
ARNOLD ROYLANCE
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT ONE
THIS COURT AND THE JURY WHICH TRIED THE
CASE IN THE COURT BELOW WERE UNDER A MISAPPREHENSION AS TO THE FINANCIAL WEALTH OF
THE DEFENDANT.

POINT TWO
THE COURT AND THE JURY HAVE IGNORED CERTAIN EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF HIMSELF GOING
4
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TO THE NATURE OF THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP
OF HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE.

POINT THREE
THE OPINION OF THE COURT ERRS IN HOLDING
THAT THERE IS NOTHING FROM WHICH IT CAN
BE DETERMINED THAT THE VERDICT WAS REACHED
AS A RESULT OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE.

POINT FOUR
IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO THE JURY DID NOT CONSTITUTE
PREJUDICIAL ERROR, THIS COURT IGNORES WITHOUT OVERRULING ESTABLISHED CASES IN THIS
JURISDICTION.
At the time this case was originally argued, Chief Justice
Wolfe, who sat during the argument of the case, stated from
tr~e bench that he was contemplating resignation from the
Court and requested that the parties consent that in the event
of such resignation, the case might be determined by a £ourman court or by a five-man court, including Chief Justice
Wolfe's successor. Both parties agreed to this proposal. Chief
Justice \Y/olfe did not resign from the Court but is still a member
thereof. Nevertheless, he did not participate in this case. We
are informed that this v,·as because of the illness of the Justice.
\\' e are further informed that Chief Justice Wolfe has sub-
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mitted his resignation to become effective late in April and
so will probably be a member of the Court when this Petition
for Rehearing is considered. It is therefore requested that
Chief Justice Wolfe participate in passing upon the Petition
for Rehearing submitted herewith or if this Petition is not
considered prior to the effective date of his resignation, that
his successor participate in considering the same.

POINT ONE
THIS COURT AND THE JURY WHICH TRIED THE
CASE IN THE COURT BELOW WERE UNDER A MISAPPREHENSION AS TO THE FINANCIAL WEALTH OF
THE DEFENDANT.
In commenting upon Dr. Oldroyd's financial worth, the
Court in its Opinion stated: ((Dr. Oldroyd is not only a successful practitioner, but also has considerable wealth in sheep,
lands and other properties aggregating to several multiples
of the judgment rendered against him." The above statement
is not sustained by the evidence. In their arguments to the
jury, counsel for the plaintiff spent more time pointing out
the wealth of the defendant than they did arguing the merits
of the case. The effect of this on the jury has been obvious
and even though the jury was instructed by the Court that they
could consider this matter only in connection with punitive
damages, it appears that the members of this jury let this
misconception as to Dr. Oldroyd's wealth affect their deliberations on compensatory damages as well. This Court has also
misconceived the evidence as did the jury.

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The evidence as to Dr. Oldroyd's financial status comes
almost entirely from Dr. Oldroyd's own deposition, which
was taken on the 15th day of February, 1952, more than nine
months before the case came to trial. In this deposition, Dr.
Oldroyd testified that he owned 2700 head of .sheep, worth
$30.00 per head, and 50 head of cattle on which no value
was placed. Further comment on the value of these sheep will
be made later. The doctor further testified that. he owned
4500 acres of grazing land and had winter and summer grazing permits for },000 head of sheep. No value was placed
upon the land or upon the grazing permits. ~e further testified
that he owned $8,000 in Government Bonds; 1,000 shares of
stock in the Commercial Bank of Utah on which the par
value was $12.50; 180 acres of pasture ground; $30,000.00 in
secured loans; $35,000.00 in accounts receivable; two automobiles; and miscellaneous tools and equipment.
This Court has held on a number of occasions that it
can take judicial notice of general economic conditions. The
Court, therefore, can take judicial notice of what happened
to the livestock industry generally during the spring months
c;[ 1952. Wool dropped in price from $1.50 per pound to
around $.50, which is still the price thereon. The price of sheep
dropped in proportion, so that sheep worth $30.00 a head
at the time the deposition was taken were worth only about
$10.00 per head at the time of the trial, which still represents
the fair value thereof. No value \vas placed upon the land.
However, the facts are that much of it was purchased by Dr.
Oldroyd for $2.00 per acre and would not exceed an average
value of $5.00 per acre. Grazing pern1its, of course, are Gov7
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ernment permits and while they have a value to the holder,
rnay not be sold and so do not represent a source of money to
Dr. Oldroyd. In regard to the $35,000.00 accounts receivable,
certainly it could not be held that they should be appraised at
face value. These are accounts receivable which Dr. Oldroyd
has acquired over his years of practice, many of which are
barred by the Statute of Limitations and most of which are
uncollectible. Probably not more thao 10 to 15% of these
will ever be realized by the Doctor. However, even taking
them at face value, the financial worth of Dr. Oldroyd at the
time of the trial stacks up about as follows:
2700 head of sheep at $10.0Q ____________________ $27,000.00
50 head of cattle at $100.00 ---------------------- 5,000.00
4680 acres of land at $5.00 per acre__________ 23,400.00

Accounts receivable ------------------------------------ 3 5,000.00
Secured debts ------------------------------------------------ 30,000.00
Government Bonds -------------------------------------- 8,000.00
Miscellaneous automobiles, equipment, etc.,
on which a liberal allowance would be____ 4,000.00
1,000 shares bank stock at $12.50 -.,---------- 12,500.00

These total approximately $146,000.00, less than twice the
amount of the judgment rendered in this case rather than
several times the amount of the judgment as was this court's
impression. Even taking the sheep and accounts at the full value
stated in February, the wealth of Dr. Oldroyd would be less
than $200,000.00. Furthermore, the Court should bear in mind
in this regard that on a forced sale the defendant will probably
not be able to realize the fair market value of these assets.
8
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Also any of the assets which he sells at a price above the price
which he paid for them over past years will be subject to
Federal Income Tax. Likewise, it should be remembered that
the defendant cannot deduct the amount of this judgment from
his income tax, and that the plaintiff takes the award income
tax free.
It is submitted that if this Court was so tn error as to
this figure, the jury having no opportunity to review the record
but having heard the evidence only once orally, would also
be mistaken in their beliefs in this regard.

POINT TWO
THE COURT AND THE JURY HAVE IGNORED CERTAIN EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF HIMSELF GOING
TO THE NATURE OF THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP
OF HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE.
In its opinion written in the case, this Court has reviewed
in great detail the facts in the case in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. We agree that this is quite proper and the
Court on appeal must consider that the jury found the facts
in favor of the respondents so far as the evidence will permit.
1-Iowever, in making its statement of facts, the Court overlooks
certain evidence that came from the plaintiff's own lips touching the nature of the marriage relationship, which evidence
neither this Court nor the jury should overlook even finding
the issues in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted that he
and his wife had discussed getting a divorce long before the
evidence indicates that she ever knew Dr. Oldroyd (T. 152).
9
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Furthermore, the plaintiff admitted that just the summer before
the affair with Dr. Oldroyd developed he had created a scene
on a public street when his wife was in company with a Dr.
Steele, plaintiff accusing his wife and Dr. Steele of improper
conduct (T. 186). Certainly both of these facts, taken in any
light, casts considerable doubt on the mutual affection and
trust between the plaintiff and his wife, yet it is evident that
the jury in their verdict and this Court in reviewing their
verdict have overlooked this evidence entirely.

POINT THREE
THE OPINION OF THE COURT ERRS IN HOLDING
THAT THERE IS NOTHING FROM WHICH IT CAN
BE DETERMINED THAT THE VERDICT WAS REACHED
AS A RESULT OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE.
This Court takes cognizance of the fact that the judgment
in this case is the highest returned in the State of Utah in a
like case and is among the highest to be found anywhere.
Counsel has already cited and the Court has taken notice of
a few cases from other jurisdictions where as high or a higher
verdict was upheld, but as the Court points out, each case must
stand upon its own merits and the facts differ greatly in
vanous cases.
The only Utah case which we have touching directly upon
this point is the case of Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197
Pac. 605, where a judgn1ent of $25,000.00 against a comparatively wealthy man, but under circumstances more aggravated than in this case, was characterized by the Court
10
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as Hpalpably excessive." While without question, the value
of the dollar has greatly declined since the decision in the Sheffield case, its decline has not exceeded two-thirds in that time.
Each member of this Court has had extensive experience
either as a trial judge or as trial counsel with jury verdicts
in the State of Utah. It is the belief of counsel that each member of the Court would have to say that under ordinary circumstances the verdict in this case, tried before the average
jury in Utah, "'ould not exceed $15,000.00 at a maximum.
The plaintiff himself in his testimony placed a maximum
figure of $15,000.00 on his damages. The following language
is found at page 190 of the Transcript where the plaintiff is
testifying regarding a conversation which he had with his
cousin Lee Nebeker, an attorney, shortly after he came into
possession of the letter which played so important a part in
this case:
((And I had talked to him, I said, tLee, I am not interested
in this as a lawsuit, I am concerned with my kids, ·and
Geraldine is going to go her way and I am going mine.'
And, I said (Ten or fifteen thousand dollars wouldn't
hurt Doc very much and it would set those kids up
and insure an education for them, and that would -be
as far as I would be interested in going.' "
Where a jury brings back a verdict for damages in an amount
of 5 times the amount of the dan1ages fixed by the plaintiff,
on \vhat basis other than a desire to punish the defendant
resulting from passion and prejudice of the jurors can such a
judgment be explained?
\\!bile

\ve

recognize the fact that what the average jury
11
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would do is not controlling upon what this particular Jury
must do, certainly there comes a point where it must be said
that a verdict is so far out of line with the value that would
be reached by the average prudent juror, that it must be held
from the size of the verdict alone that it was arrived at on
some other basis than a fair and impartial weighing of values,
including financial loss, emotional distress and the other factors.
Indeed in most cases the only evidence that a verdict was
reached on a basis of passion and prejudice would be the size
of the verdict alone. It is impossible, of course, to look into
· the minds of the jurors or to question them upon the basis
which they reached the verdict. Therefore, unless there is some
gross error committed at the trial, which in itself would be
ground for a reversal, there can generally be no evidence other
than the size of the verdict going to the proposition that it
was reached on the basis of passion and prejudice.
This Court held in the case of Wheat v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Co., 250 Pac. (2d) 932, that if a
verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have been
motivated by passion and prejudice, that a reduced verdict
should not be ordered but a new trial granted in its entirety.
If then, we are to say that before the average prudent jury,
this verdict would not exceed $15,000.00, must we not as a
matter of logic say that a jury returning a $75,000.00 verdict
did not arrive at its verdict on the basis of reason and logic
but upon the basis of passion and prejudice. Our position on
this point is borne out by the treatment which the Court makes
of punitive damages in this case. In considering punitive
damages, of course, we must consider that portion of the verdict
12
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by itself as it is returned upon a different basis entirely than
is the verdict for compensatory damages. However, as this
Court held in the case of Evans v. Gaisford, 247 Pac. (2d)
431, and as it again points out in this case, punitive damages
standing alone must not be so disproportionate to the injury
and the actual damage as to plainly manifest that they were
the result of passion and prejudice. This Court has determined
that the maximum amount which the jury should have found
as punitive damage~ in this case was $5,000.00. The jury found
$25,000.00 or five times the amount that this Court found that
in reason and logic they could have found.
Once again referring to the case of Wheat v. Denver &
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 250 Pac. (2d) 932, we
point out that this Court has already held that the size of the
verdict alone, in the absence of other evidence, may show
that it was arrived at by passion and prejudice where it is so
disproportionate to the in jury that no other basis can explain
the disproportion.
The question which must now be answered is: How disproportionate to the in jury must the verdict be before it can
Ge held to have been arrived at by passion and prejudice on
the basis of the size of the verdict alone? Counsel can find
nu case in which this Court or any other Court has cut a verdict
by 80% and still allo\ved the balance to stand. In the case of
Collins v. Hughes and Riddle, 278 1~orthwestern, 889, the
jury a\varded $15,000.00 for a spinal injury. The Trial Court
reduced the verdict to $5,000.00 The Appellate Court held
that the verdict should not be reduced 66 2/3% and still
2.llo\ved to stand, but that where such a cut was necessary in
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order to bring the verdict into line with reason, it should be
sent back for a new trial entirely.
qnce again we urge upon the Court that at some point
of disproportion we must say that by the size of the verdict
alone that in justice it was reached on the basis of passion
and prejudice. Is this when the verdict is one hundred times
what is fair and equitable; when it is ten times what is fair
and equitable; or, as the Nebraska Court holds, when it is
three times what is fair and equitable? Certainly, when the
verdict, as in this case, is five times what is fair and equitable
under the evidence as this Court has held in regard to the
punitive damages, it certain! y must be said that it is so disproportionate to the in jury as to indicate that the verdict was
arrived at on the basis of passion and prejudice. If the punitive
damages were arrived at on the basis of passion and prejudice,
could it then logically be said that the compensatory damages
arrived at by the same jury in the same deliberation on the
same evidence were in no way affeeted by passion or prejudice.
In a recent case of Lehman v. Neuman Transit Co., Civil
No. 97011, Third District Court, decided before Judge Ellett
and in which case one of the counsel for Dr. Oldroyd was the
counsel for the plaintiff, the jury returned a verdict of $42,000.00 against the defendant for negligently causing the death
of plaintiff's wife. In that case there was no question of the
husband himself having contributed to the injury, nor was
there any question that the wife had been a devoted and loving
companion and that by her death the husband had suffered
as much as a husband can suffer by the loss of a wife, yet in
that case Judge Ellett held that a verdict of $42,000.00 was

,~

/

t
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excessive and ordered that a new trial be granted unless the
plaintiff accept a reduction to $25,000.00.

POINT FOUR
IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO THE JURY DID NOT CONSTITUTE
PREJUDICIAL ERROR, THIS COURT IGNORES WITHOUT OVERRULING ESTABLISHED CASES IN THIS
JURISDICTION.
Counsel wishes again to urge upon the Court the position
that the giving of Instruction No. 6 constituted prejudicial
error. Again "\Ve wish to point out that this instruction is almost
identical in its language with the instruction for which the
case of Buckley v. Francis, 6 Pac. (2d) 188, was reversed, the
minor difference being that in the Buckley case the court
instructed the jury that the law presumes love and affection
between a husband and wife, v1hereas in this case the Court
instructed the jury that the law presumes the possibility of
a reconciliation between an estranged husband and wife. We
ag;ee completley with the statement of the court that the fact
that a husband and v1ife are estranged does not allow a stranger
t0 interfere with impunity. However, the degree of damages
is directly related to the possibility or probability of reconciliation just as the degree of damages is directly related to the
presence or absence of love and affection between a husband
and \vife. If, in the Buckley case, the jury had found that there
wa~ no love and affection between the wife and husband, no
substantial verdict could be returned and therefore it was
1)
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held prejudicial error for the court to direct the jury that there
was a presumption of love and affection where there was
already evidence in the case where the jury could find without
resort to a presumption. In this case, if the jury were to find
from the evidence that there was no possibility for a reconciliation between plaintiff and his wife before the acts of the
defendant complained of, then there would be no basis upon
which the jury could have found any substantial damages.
The defendant had introduced evidence designed to show
and which, if believed by the jury would show, that there
was no possibility of such a reconciliation. If the court had
instructed the jury in effect ~~you shall determine from the
evidence whether or not there was a possibility of reconciliation" certainly the law would be properly stated, but the
court instructed the jury that the law presumes such a possibility. In other words, the instruction was equivalent to saying,
~~In spite of the evidence to the contrary, you are to consider
this case on a basis that there \vas a possibility of a reconnciliation." Counsel cannot see how it answers this problem to
say that the jury may not have interpreted the language in
this fashion. Why would this jury put any different interpretation on this language than did the jury in the Buckley case, and
yet the court in that case held that the language placed the
jury in such a position that it would have to weigh a presumption against the evidence. Here, as in the Buckley case,
the instruction goes not so much to the fundamental elements
of the cause of action as to the measure of damages, and certain! y in this case it is obvious from the size of the verdict
that the jury must have found that there was a possibility
of a reconciliation. In doing this, the plaintiff had in favor

16
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of his contention no evidence, but only the instruction of
the court as to a presun1ption. Counsel urges that this instruction constituted prejudicial error and that the court should
not speculate upon the interpretation which the jury placed
upon the words when it is evident that they n1ight well have
placed an interpretation thereon that would be highly prejudicial to the defendant in this case.

CONCLUSION
Counsel submits that justice requires a rehearing in this
case. Members of the bar and members of the lay public to
whom counsel have talked have generally expressed surprise
and amazement at the size of the judgment as originally
rendered and as modified by this court. To compel the plaintiff
to pay the amount of the modified judgment would be an
injustice of the gravest character.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE W. WORTHEN
ARNOLD ROYLANCE
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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